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Dear Mr. President:

Advise to President Truman on Recognizing the Jewish State
By Mark Couturier
ixty years ago this week, the United Nations, with strong support from the United States, voted to partition Palestine and create an
independent Jewish state. The next year, on May 14, 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel proclaimed the new State of Israel and
President Truman immediately issued a statement of U.S. recognition. The creation and recognition of Israel fueled a conflict between the
Israelis and Palestinians that had been ongoing since the second decade of the 20th century. On May 15th, 1948, Palestinians invaded Israel
and the first Arab-Israeli war began. Conflict has continued ever since.

S

The following policy statement, written by Hauenstein Center intern Mark Couturier, reconstructs the original arguments provided to the
President Truman by his top aides to justify the recognition of Israel.

Washington - February 23, 1948
Mr. President:
The rapidly deteriorating situation in Palestine carries with it grave implications on a regional and global
scale and thus demands decisive action on the part of our government in order to alleviate the crisis. It is
no exaggeration to say that the course we choose to take in this matter could very well affect the long-term
national security and prosperity of this country and its allies and determine the future of stability in the
Middle East. In light of the serious nature of this problem, it is essential that you be presented with all
major policy options as well as their potential benefits and drawbacks. Hopefully, this report will aid you
in your attempt to find a solution to this vexing issue.
President Harry S. Truman and
Israeli President Dr. Chaim

Before I go into a thorough examination of the viable choices that are available to our government, I will Weizmann
first give a quick summary of the origins of this crisis so that you may better comprehend the gravity of the
situation and make a more informed decision. Great Britain acquired Palestine as a League of Nations
mandate at the end of the First World War. Jews had begun to immigrate to the area in significant numbers at the end of the last century, mainly
from Eastern Europe. While most of them came to Palestine to escape religious persecution and establish agricultural settlements, the emerging
Zionist movement played a pivotal role in the arrival of these newcomers.[1] On November 2, 1917, the British government issued the Balfour
Declaration, which proclaimed that government's support for the establishment of a "Jewish national home."[2] In response to this document as
well as the large influx of Jewish émigrés into Palestine, the Arabs began to protest and engage in violence as a means of forcing the British to
change their immigration policies in the mandate. In 1929, Arab militants conducted a massacre of Jews in the town of Hebron, killing sixtyseven. They also carried on a countrywide rebellion that lasted from 1936 to 1939 and left thousands of people dead. In response to the attacks
leveled at them, the Jews began to organize their own paramilitary groups, such as Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi. In May 1939, the British
government finally acceded to Arab demands by issuing the White Paper, which resulted in a virtual halt of Jewish immigration to Palestine.[3]
The recent war in Europe and the murder of over six millions Jews by Nazi Germany has added a new dimension to the problem in the Middle
East. Hundreds of thousands of Jewish Holocaust survivors are currently trapped in horrendous living conditions. The overwhelming majority
of them have nowhere to go. They cannot return to their native countries due to the unremitting hostility that awaits them.[4] Also, many
industrialized countries are, for the most part, closed to foreigners. As for Palestine, the British have largely refused to relax their tight
immigration restrictions for fear of angering the local Arab population. This rigid policy has resulted in the smuggling of thousands of displaced
persons into the mandate and attacks on British military and law enforcement personnel by Jewish terrorists from Irgun and Lehi.[5]
In late 1945, a group of American and British officials was commissioned to look into the Palestinian issue and come up with possible ways to
resolve the crisis. The Anglo-American Committee -- as the group came to be known -- concluded its investigation in April of the following
year. The report of the committee called for the immigration of one hundred thousand displaced persons to Palestine as well as the continuation
of British rule there until a trusteeship under the auspices of the United Nations could be established in the mandate. However, these conclusions
were shelved due to refusal on the part of the British to move on the recommendations before they could reach a consensus with the Americans
on a comprehensive political solution to the Palestine problem.[6] Shortly after, another committee of Americans and British officials met in
London and hammered out the Morrison-Grady Plan. This plan broached the idea of making Palestine a unitary federal state comprised of semiautonomous Arab and Jewish provinces.[7] Also included was the entry of the one hundred thousand displaced persons into the mandate. The
recommendations of the second joint committee seemed to provide the basis for a viable resolution to the Palestine crisis -- as you yourself
acknowledged, Mr. President -- but, unfortunately, domestic considerations forced us to back off from the idea.
Last May the U.N. formed a committee -- the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) -- in an attempt to find a solution to the
Palestine issue. After three months of investigation, the group presented its recommendations at the end of August. A majority of the members
indicated in the report that they favored partitioning Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish States and placing Bethlehem and Jerusalem under
U.N. control. A month later, the British colonial secretary made an announcement to the General Assembly in which he stated the intention of
his government to end its mandate in Palestine and evacuate all British troops from the area by the following May. On November 29, the
Assembly voted on and approved the passage of U.N. Resolution 181 -- which calls for implementation of the Partition Plan -- by a vote of thirtythree to thirteen.[8] While the Jews have been largely supportive of the measure, the Arabs have flatly rejected it. A vicious civil war has broken
out between the two sides since the United Nations vote, which has only served to further exacerbate the precarious situation we now find
ourselves in.[9]
One course of action that we might take to solve the problem in Palestine would be to implement the partition plan and help set up sovereign
states for the Jews and Arabs. After all, this is the solution that the United Nations approved after lengthy deliberation. Also, given our active
support of Resolution 181 as well as your previous statements in support of the Zionists' goal, we would be remiss to neglect our obligations at
this crucial point and downplay our vital role as a leader in the Middle East. One immediate advantage to this action would be the resolution of
the DP issue. The Jews of Palestine would throw their doors open to their European brethren and absorb them into the new state with relative
ease. It should also be mentioned here that the creation of a Jewish homeland would right a grave historical wrong. In light of the horror and
suffering that they have endured in the last war, it would seem imperative that the Sons and Daughters of Abraham be granted a place where they
may always find refuge from external dangers.[10] Ethical considerations are equally as important in these matters as those concerning policy. It
is also worthy of note that this position is one shared by an overwhelming majority of Americans.[11]
It is the opinion of Mr. Clifford that our active support of the Partition Plan would be "consistent with American interests in the Middle East and
in accord with traditional policy in the area." A Jewish state in the Middle East could serve as a bastion of republicanism in a region that has
virtually no tradition of democratic rule. Such a development could well prove to be a benefit to our national security in the long run.[12] It is
the opinion of some in the State Department and the intelligence agencies that an independent Jewish state would choose a Communist
government and align itself with the Soviet Union. According to these people, several military reports indicate the increasing presence of Soviet
agents into the Yishuv (Palestinian Jewish community). However, Mr. Clifford denies the veracity of these claims and says maintains that such an
outcome is unlikely given the fact that Jewish society seems to be founded upon the values of the free enterprise system. Also, it should be noted
that many Jewish émigrés to Palestine are refugees from Communist regimes and that the Yishuv receives financial backing largely from the
American Jewish community, which is staunchly opposed to the tenets of Marxism. The only way that Communism could triumph in a Jewish
State would be as a result of a military vacuum and the failure of United Nations control in the area. Indeed, Mr. Clifford concludes that a free
Jewish state "would have the strongest possible orientation to the United States."[13]
ence would
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crisis on the pretext of restoring peace and stability in the region. Were such an event to occur, it would likely escalate tensions between our two
countries and possibly trigger a catastrophic war.[14]
Another argument in the case for implementing partition deals with the upcoming presidential election. There are many supporters of the Zionist
cause in this country who might wield a significant degree of influence in key states in November.[15] While domestic political considerations
should not weigh too heavily on decisions regarding vital matters in foreign affairs, I feel it is essential that you be familiarized with the full
implications of each course of action, be they international or domestic.
One significant disadvantage to this option is that the United States could be compelled to dispatch a sizable military force to buttress the new
Jewish state. Reports from the Defense Department indicate that the Jews of Palestine -- who number only six hundred thousand people -- are
faring poorly in the ongoing civil war in the mandate. The Arab forces have managed to break the Jews' communication lines and isolate many
of their communities. The situation has also enflamed the populations of surrounding Arab states, an ominous development that may result in
their involvement in this imbroglio. It is the opinion of many in this government that should this happen, the Jews would be doomed without the
help of outside forces.[16]
Should America intervene militarily, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that such a move would necessitate a force of at least one hundred
thousand men. Due to the present size of our army, partial mobilization will be required to reach this number. Also, we would not be able to
count on our British allies to aid us in this endeavor, due to their desire to extricate themselves from this situation and avoid angering the Arabs.
Indeed, it is likely that the United States would end up providing the bulk of any international force sent to the mandate to impose partition. In
addition, several members of the defense establishment predict that an American deployment to the area could ignite an Arab war aimed at
"driving the Jews into the sea."[17]
Another potential drawback of military intervention in Palestine is the torrent of domestic anti-Semitism that might accompany such a course of
action. While the American people generally favor the idea of establishing a Jewish state in the Middle East, Secretary Forrestal feels that such
support would surely erode if American soldiers end up doing much of the fighting and dying on behalf of that state. Indeed, polls indicate that a
vast majority of the public is against any kind of military involvement in the area, especially if that involvement was unilateral. Also, many
people over at State and Defense believe that were American troops to enter Palestine to enforce the partition plan, they would encounter a
considerable degree of armed resistance from both the Arab and Jewish paramilitary forces. Such a scenario could only exacerbate any possible
anti-Semitism at home.[18]
Another potential outcome of this course of action that must be considered is the possibility that an independent Jewish state would attempt to
pull the United States into its affairs. To achieve this goal, the Jewish state might have the various Zionist organizations in this country use their
political and financial power to pressure our government to support that state's policies in the Middle East. If this scenario were to come to pass,
it could create a situation whereby a foreign government is able to exert undue influence over our policies vis-a-vis other nations.[19]
Probably the most serious drawback of implementing the partition plan is the affect it would have on our relations with the Arab states. Most of
the people in the Moslem world do not want to see a Jewish state created in their midst. In light of the fact that the Arabs make up the
overwhelming majority of the population in the Middle East and possess access to the bulk of that region's natural resources, it might be prudent
for us to avoid taking any course of action that would alienate them, thus denying ourselves the possibility of forging crucial partnerships in a
strategic part of the world. It is imperative that we maintain the ability to tap into the abundant oil reserves of the Middle East. Supporting
partition would hamper this ability and forfeit any potential alliances with the Arabs. Indeed, our Saudi friends have been under tremendous
pressure from Iraq and Transjordan to cut off all diplomatic and economic ties with us.[20] Were we to come out in full support of the partition
plan to the point of sending troops into Palestine on behalf of the Jews, the Arabs might cut off oil supplies to the West. Such action would not
only spell potential disaster for us, but also for our European allies. Middle Eastern oil is an essential component to the revival of the Western
European economies. If Western access to that oil were denied in any way, such a turn of events would put the Marshall Plan in grave jeopardy
and render our allies vulnerable in the face of the Soviet menace.[21] Several supporters of partition in the administration maintain that such an
outcome would be highly unlikely to occur. They point out that many of the Arab countries are heavily dependent on American dollars as well as
American trade, and would not wish to do anything that would jeopardize their relationship with us. While this is no doubt true, it is also
possible that the populations of those countries might force their leaders to take an anti-American stance for fear of being overthrown.[22]
Another disadvantage to this option is the potential rise of anti-American sentiment in the Arab world that would surely result as a response to
our actions. Such sentiment could endanger the lives of many Americans residing in the Middle East as well as the lives of Jews in Arab
countries. American businesses and cultural institutions would also be adversely affected. Arab regimes would most likely shut down American
schools and universities and nationalize or expropriate American companies. Many of our citizens would lose their financial investments in the
region, which are estimated to total hundreds of millions of dollars.[23]
This option may also have an adverse affect on our ability to contain the threat of Communism. Due to the particular location of the Middle East,
it is imperative that we be allowed to maintain strategic air and naval bases in the region. These bases will serve as potential launching pads for
attacks on vulnerable points in the Soviet Union in the event of war between our two countries. In light of the present decline of the French and
British in the area, the United States has an obligation to fill the void and assume its rightful leadership role. Yet, this task will be difficult to
accomplish if we are denied access to those bases, and our ability to face the Russians will be seriously hampered.[24]
Another potential fallout from this course of action would be the defection of the Arabs to the Soviet camp. Several officials from the State and
Defense departments are of the opinion that such a scenario could facilitate Soviet penetration into the region -- a move that would bring about
serious repercussions.[25] It is of the utmost importance for our containment policy that we keep the Soviets out of the affairs of the Middle East
to the extent that we are able to do so. For the reasons outlined above, we must avoid having a population that is hostile to us in that part of the
world. As far as State and Defense are concerned, this consideration outweighs any potential benefit that we could derive from supporting a
Jewish state. In relation to this issue, it must be pointed out that, regardless of Arab opinion, any intervention that would place American troops
near the Russian border might provoke the Soviets into sending their military into the region -- possibly as part of an international force -- under
the guise of promoting stability. As you well know, any encounter between American and Soviet soldiers in such circumstances could trigger an
all-out war between the two superpowers.[26]
Another disadvantage to throwing our weight behind the partition plan that must be considered is the possibility of an irreparable split in the
administration -- a development that could have serious repercussions both for matters concerning policymaking and the upcoming election.
Several members of the State Department remain staunchly opposed to the idea of partition, and if the administration were to take this particular
course of action without managing to bring these people onboard, the result could well be resignations in key positions.[27]
A second option in dealing with this crisis would be for us to support the idea of placing Palestine under a trusteeship administered by the United
Nations. Taking such a position on the issue would absolve the United States of any responsibility for the enforcement of the partition plan and
allow our government to avoid being seen as actively supporting the establishment of a Jewish state. The Trusteeship Plan would also give more
time for the U.N. to seek a possible compromise between the Arabs and Jews.[28]
One of the drawbacks of this option is that it could face rejection from both sides and only serve to further exacerbate the conflict. The
trusteeship also has the potential of jeopardizing the chances of creating any future Jewish state, for if the matter were referred to the United
Nations, there is a high probability that the Arabs would employ a combination of military and diplomatic measures to ensure that such a state
never comes into existence.[29] We could also expect to face stiff opposition from the pro-Zionist forces in this country, which would doubtless
have significant repercussions in the upcoming elections.
Enforcement of the Trusteeship Plan will also necessitate the deployment of American troops to the region -- possibly more than would have
been required under the partition plan. The dispatch of a military force to Palestine carries with it the same implications as those I have outlined
above in the first option, especially if trusteeship is opposed by both Arabs and Jews.[30] Moreover, if we succeed in defeating Resolution 181
in favor of the trusteeship proposal, we run the risk of seriously undermining the United Nations. Such a development could erode the credibility
of the infant organization and weaken its ability to mediate future conflict around the globe.[31] Also, abandoning our support for the partition
plan -- particularly in light of our monumental efforts to convince members of the General Assembly to vote for it -- could possibly result in
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irreparable damage to our credibility as a leader in the world. Naturally, such a development would cause some of our allies to question our
decisiveness and make them reluctant to send troops to Palestine as part of a multilateral force, should that sort of action be required.[32]
A third possible course of action would be for this government to refuse to implement the partition plan without officially endorsing the
trusteeship proposal. Choosing this option would allow us to retreat from our previous stance on partition -- while not actively opposing it -- and
release us from any potential military commitments in the mandate. In doing this, we could avoid antagonizing the Arabs in the Middle East as
well as the pro-Zionist forces in this country. As the situation deteriorates in Palestine, the United Nations might act on its own accord and take
the necessary steps to postpone implementing Resolution 181 and set up a trusteeship in the area.[33] Also, taking a step back from this conflict
and assuming a neutral stance would put us in a position to observe events as they unfold in the mandate and allow us to consider any future
options that may arise.
There are some potentially serious drawbacks to this course of action, however. The United Nations could be seriously weakened by our inaction
and ultimately lack the ability to act on the provisions of either the partition or trusteeship plans. If the organization is to be a guiding force for
peace and stability in the world, it must be able to show that it possesses the strength to carry out its resolutions. Without the support of the
United States, this task will prove to be exceedingly difficult -- if not impossible -- to accomplish.[34] Should the United Nations fail in its
efforts to impose partition or trusteeship in Palestine, there is the possibility that the international body could be forced to turn to the Soviet Union
for assistance -- a grave possibility for the reasons mentioned above. Also -- as with the second option -- this course would undermine our
credibility at a time when it is needed most.
While the action we eventually take in this matter will be wholly at your discretion Mr. President, it is my belief that the last option I have
outlined offers the best chance for a resolution to this crisis. While a decision to withhold American troops from the Middle East could incur a
Soviet intervention in the region, such an outcome is possible in the other two cases as well. Backing off from openly supporting partition while
simultaneously maintaining a noncommittal stance toward trusteeship will allow us to bide our time and see if better alternatives present
themselves in the future. In light of our dependence on the Arab states for their friendship and resources, it would be national suicide for us -- and
possibly for our European allies -- to get involved in a potential war for the sake of a tiny Jewish state, however noble such an undertaking might
prove to be. Even if a temporarily neutral posture were to cost the administration a great amount of political and financial support at home, I
believe that domestic considerations should not in any way take precedence over issues relating to foreign policy. The stakes are simply too high.
How we act today could very well affect the state of our great nation as well as the international community for decades to come.

[1] Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 88.
[2] Reuben Fink, ed., America and Palestine: The Attitude of Official America and of the American People Toward the Rebuilding of Palestine as
a Free and Democrat Jewish Commonwealth (New York: Harold Square Press, Inc., 1945), 432.
[3] Robert Silverberg, If I Forget Thee O Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of Israel (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.,
1970), 173.
[4] Michael J. Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 129.
[5] Leslie Stein, The Hope Fulfilled: The Rise of Modern Israel (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 250.
[6] Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 267.
[7] Dan Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision: Origins and Implications of American Involvement with the Palestine Problem (Los Angeles:
Praeger Publishers, 1983), 193.
[8] Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry, and Israel, 1945-1948 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 146.
[9] Cohen, Truman, 173.
[10] Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 69.
[11] Cohen, Truman, 56.
[12] Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1992), 12.
[13] Ganin, Truman, 160.
[14] Cohen, Truman, 189.
[15] John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), 78-80.
[16] Sachar, Israel, 299-300.
[17] David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 602.
[18] Cohen, Truman, 177.
[19] Ganin, Truman, 158.
[20] Cohen, Truman, 96.
[21] Silverberg, Jerusalem, 347.
[22] Ganin, Truman, 147.
[23] Cohen, Truman, 98.
[24] Snetsinger, Truman, 13-14.
[25] Tschirgi, Politics, 138.
[26] Cohen, Truman, 158.
[27] Clifford, Counsel, 15.
[28] Snetsinger, Truman, 89.
[29] Clifford, Counsel, 8.
[30] Snetsinger, Truman, 92.
[31] Steve Neal, ed., Eleanor and Harry: The Correspondence of Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (New York: Scribner, 2002), 123-124.
[32] Cohen, Truman, 195.
[33] Ibid., 180-182.

http://www.gvsu.edu/hauenstein/special-aide-to-the-president-171.htm

3/2/2011

Special Aide to the President - The Hauenstein Center for Presidential Studies - Grand Va... Page 4 of 4

[34] Snetsinger, Truman, 93-94.

http://www.gvsu.edu/hauenstein/special-aide-to-the-president-171.htm

3/2/2011

